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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings are two main forms of corporate 
liquidity. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) find that the average cash-to-assets ratio for 
US firms was 23.2% in 2006. Sufi (2009) finds that bank lines of credit have an 
average magnitude of 16% of assets in a sample of US firms. In this paper, we 
examine how the presence of labor unions affects a firm’s choice of corporate 
liquidity between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. 
      Corporate cash holdings are a firm’s internal resources, while bank lines of credit 
are an external source of financing. Previous research in the literature (e.g., Baldwin, 
1983; Bronars and Deere, 1991) argues that debt increases a firm’s bargaining power 
over labor. Because a firm obtains a certain amount of debt capacity when it receives 
bank lines of credit, the firm can increase the amount of debt by drawing down the 
lines of credit if it anticipates that bargaining with labor unions will take place. 
Moreover, while cash is a form of realized liquidity, the availability of bank lines of 
credit is usually subject to a firm’s compliance with covenants (e.g., Sufi, 2009; Yun, 
2009).  A firm can make a more credible case that the risk associated with the 
unavailability of bank lines of credit can threaten its competitive viability, a situation 
that would be exacerbated by granting additional concessions to the union. Therefore, 
a firm can use more bank lines of credit as a source of corporate liquidity to gain a 
better bargaining position against labor unions.  
     We hypothesize that a firm holds a higher fraction of corporate liquidity in the 
form of bank lines of credit when unionization rates are higher. Moreover, we develop 
hypotheses on how right-to-work legislation and financial constraints affect the 
relation between unionization rates and forms of corporate liquidity.  
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In our empirical tests, we use industry unionization rates, defined as the fraction 
of workers in an industry who are covered by labor unions in collective bargaining, as 
our measure of the bargaining power of labor unions. We use the ratio of bank lines of 
credit to the sum of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings as our measure of 
a firm’s choice of the forms of corporate liquidity. Because endogeneity can be a 
potential concern, we use instrumental variables with two-stage least squares 
estimation.   
We find that firms hold a higher fraction of corporate liquidity in the form of bank 
lines of credit in the presence of stronger labor unions.  The data show that a one 
standard deviation increase in the fraction of workers covered by labor unions leads to 
a 14.48% increase in the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of unused 
lines of credit. This corresponds to an increase in unused lines of credit with a dollar 
value of 37.20 million dollars. Moreover, we find that the level of bank lines of credit 
increases with unionization rates.  
We divide the firms into sub-groups and find that a positive relation between 
unionization rates and the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of bank lines 
of credit exists in the sub-group of firms that are not in a state with right-to-work 
legislation. We conduct the analysis for a sub-sample of firms whose state of 
operation is the same as the state of incorporation and find similar results. Moreover, 
we use the Heckman two-stage estimation to control for a firm’s self-section of the 
state of incorporation/operation and find similar results. In addition, we examine labor 
costs and operating profitability. We find that there is a negative relation (no relation) 
between the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of bank lines of credit and 
labor costs for firms that are not in (are in) a state with right-to-work legislation and 
that there is a positive relation (no relation) between the fraction of corporate liquidity 
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held in the form of bank lines of credit and operating profitability for firms that are 
not in (are in) a state with right-to-work legislation. 
We also divide the firms into sub-groups and find that a positive relation between 
unionization rates and the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of bank lines 
of credit exists in firms that are financially constrained. We conduct robustness 
checks and find similar results when we control for labor intensity and when we use 
union membership as an alternative measure of the bargaining power of labor unions. 
We conclude that our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that a firm chooses 
the forms of corporate liquidity to take advantage of the bargaining benefits 
associated with bank lines of credit. 
Our study makes two main contributions. First, our research extends the literature 
by providing evidence on how labor, as a type of stakeholder, affects a firm’s choice 
of corporate liquidity.  While the literature reveals various reasons why a firm chooses 
corporate liquidity between bank lines of credit and cash holdings,1 to our knowledge, 
no previous research documents the relation between labor and a firm’s choice of the 
forms of corporate liquidity. For example, Sufi (2009) shows that high cash flows are 
an important determinant of the forms of corporate liquidity because they allow firms 
to comply with cash flow-based covenants associated with bank lines of credit. Yun 
(2009) finds that firms increase cash relative to lines of credit after a change in 
takeover legislation that weakens the threat of takeover. Lins, Servaes and Tufano 
(2010) find that lines of credit are strongly related to a firm’s need for external 
                                                 
1
 Besides a firm’s choice of the forms of corporate liquidity, various determinants of corporate cash 
holdings have been examined in the literature. For example, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson 
(1999) argue that corporate cash holdings can be explained by the tradeoff theory, the financing 
hierarchy theory and the agency theory. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) find that the level of 
corporate cash holdings is determined by the degree of shareholder protection in different countries. 
Tong (2010) finds that firms with higher CEO risk incentives have less cash holdings. Neamtiu, Shroff, 
White and Williams (2014) find that macroeconomic ambiguity is positively associated with cash 
holdings. 
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financing to fund future investment opportunities and that cash is primarily held as a 
general buffer against future cash flow shortfalls. Campello, Graham and Harvey 
(2010) show that small, private, junk-rated, and unprofitable firms have larger credit 
lines and that firms with high internal liquidity find lines of credit less valuable.  
Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2009) examine how a firm’s exposure to aggregate 
risk affects its management of liquidity through bank lines of credit and cash holdings.  
Tong (2012) finds that diversified firms hold a higher fraction of corporate liquidity in 
the form of bank lines of credit due to the coinsurance effect. Therefore, we extend 
the literature by disclosing a new dimension that affects a firm’s choice of the forms 
of corporate liquidity. 
     Second, we add to the literature on how strategic considerations that arise in 
bargaining between firms and labor unions affect corporate decisions. Specifically, we 
provide evidence that the bargaining power of labor unions affects a firm’s choice 
between bank lines of credit and cash holdings.  Previous research in the corporate 
finance literature focuses on the impact of labor unions on leverage (e.g., Bronars and 
Deere, 1991; Hanka, 1998; Matsa, 2010), earnings management (e.g., DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 1991; D’Souza, Jacob and Ramesh, 2001), and the cost of equity (e.g., 
Chen, Kacperczyk and Ortiz-Molina, 2012). Moreover, Agrawal (2012) finds that 
labor union pension funds have preferences that partly reflect union worker interests 
rather than equity value maximization alone. A previous study related to our research 
is Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009), who study how the bargaining power of 
labor unions affects a firm’s management of corporate cash holdings. Our study 
differs from Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009) in that they only study 
corporate cash holdings, while we examine a firm’s choice of the forms of corporate 
liquidity between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data and the variables. Section 4 illustrates the methodology. Section 5 
presents the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Corporate cash holdings are a firm’s internal resources, while bank lines of credit are 
an external source of financing. A firm obtains a certain amount of debt capacity 
when it receives bank lines of credit. Used lines of credit are recorded as a debt 
obligation, while unused lines remain off balance sheet. We analyze the bargaining 
benefits associated with bank lines of credit relative to corporate cash holdings from 
the perspectives of debt capacity and the possible unavailability of bank lines of credit. 
 
(i) Debt Capacity 
There is a body of literature on how a firm’s use of debt can affect the bargaining 
between the firm and labor (e.g., Baldwin, 1983; Bronars and Deere, 1991; Dasgupta 
and Sengupta, 1993; Perotti and Spier, 1993; Sarig, 1998; Hanka, 1998; Matsa, 2010).  
The essential rationale in this literature is that if a firm has a substantial amount of 
debt, employees can accept a lower wage, provided that bankruptcy is costly for them. 
Consequently, debt increases a firm’s bargaining position against labor.2 
      This feature implies that a firm can increase the amount of debt by drawing down 
bank lines of credit if the firm anticipates that bargaining with labor unions will take 
place. This will result in an increase in the firm’s bargaining position against labor 
                                                 
2
 For example, Bronars and Deere (1991) develop a model in which firms use debt to protect the wealth 
of shareholders from the threat of unionization. By issuing debt, firms can credibly reduce the funds 
that are available to a potential union when bankruptcy is costly. Bronars and Deere show that there is a 
cooperative Nash solution where the union moderates its demand in the face of outstanding debt, and 
that there is a negative relation between the union wage and debt. 
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due to the increase in debts. For example, Myers and Saretto (2011) find that unions 
are less likely to strike when a firm increases leverage prior to a contract negotiation. 
Previous research (e.g., Sufi, 2009; Yun, 2009) finds that bank lines of credit have an 
average magnitude of 16% of total assets. Given such a large magnitude of debt 
capacity, the increase in a firm’s bargaining position against labor can be 
economically significant if the firm draws down a substantial number of lines of 
credit before the negotiation with labor takes place. 
      Therefore, as a source of debt capacity, bank lines of credit enable a firm to gain a 
better bargaining position against labor. This feature is not shared by corporate cash 
holdings as an alternative source of corporate liquidity.  
 
(ii) The Possible Unavailability of Bank Lines of Credit 
While cash is a realized form of corporate liquidity, the availability of bank lines of 
credit is usually conditional and subject to a firm’s compliance with covenants (e.g., 
Sufi, 2009; Yun, 2009). By implementing a policy of holding more corporate liquidity 
in the form of bank lines of credit rather than cash holdings, a firm can make a more 
credible case that the risk associated with the unavailability of bank lines of credit can 
threaten its competitive viability, a situation that would be exacerbated by granting 
additional concessions to the union. This enables a firm to obtain a better bargaining 
position against labor. 
 
(iii) Hypotheses 
We hypothesize that a firm chooses the forms of corporate liquidity to take advantage 
of the bargaining benefits associated with bank lines of credit. 
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(a) Unionization Rates 
If the unionization rate is higher, labor unions have stronger bargaining powers. 
Consequently, the benefits of holding more corporate liquidity in the form of bank 
links of credit are larger for a firm. We expect that a firm will hold more corporate 
liquidity in the form of bank lines of credit in the presence of stronger labor unions. 
Therefore, we have the following hypothesis. 
     Hypothesis 1: A firm holds a higher fraction of corporate liquidity in the form of 
bank lines of credit if the unionization rate is higher. 
 
(b) Right-to-work Legislation 
Several recent papers on labor and finance have developed their research setting based 
on various laws. For example, Agrawal and Matsa (2013) examine changes in state 
unemployment insurance laws and find that higher unemployment benefits lead to 
increased corporate leverage. Simintzi, Vig and Volpin (2012) investigate inter-
temporal variations in employment protection laws across 21 countries and find that 
labor-friendly reforms are associated with a reduction in firm leverage. John, 
Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2013) examine the state variation in labor rights laws and 
find that acquirers with stronger labor rights experience lower announcement returns.  
     We also take advantage of the difference in state labor laws and develop another 
hypothesis based on right-to-work legislation. The Labor-Management Relations Act 
(the Taft-Hartley Act) passed in 1947 granted the states in the US the power to enact 
right-to-work legislation. Right-to-work legislation outlaws provisions in employment 
contracts that require employees to join or financially support labor unions.  Previous 
research has found that the bargaining power of labor unions is lower in states with 
right-to-work legislation (e.g., Ellwood and Fine, 1987; Holmes, 1998).  We expect 
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that a firm that is not in a state with right-to-work legislation is more motivated to 
take advantage of the bargaining benefits associated with bank lines of credit than a 
firm that is in a state with such legislation because right-to-work legislation weakens 
the bargaining power of labor unions. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis.  
     Hypothesis 2:  The positive relation between the fraction of corporate liquidity 
held in the form of bank lines of credit and the unionization rate is 
stronger (weaker) for firms that are not in (are in) a state with 
right-to-work legislation. 
 
(c) Financial Constraints 
If a firm is financially constrained, the risk of liquidity shortage stemming from the 
possible unavailability of bank lines of credit is more credible. If a firm is financially 
unconstrained, labor will tend to believe that the firm can obtain alternative resources 
when bank lines of credit become unavailable. We expect that a financially 
constrained firm is more motivated to take advantage of the bargaining benefits 
associated with bank lines of credit than a financially unconstrained firm. Therefore, 
we have the following hypothesis.  
     Hypothesis 3:  The positive relation between the fraction of corporate liquidity 
held in the form of bank lines of credit and the unionization rate is 
stronger (weaker) for financially constrained (unconstrained) firms. 
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3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
We describe the data and the variables in this section. 
 
(i) Data 
We use U.S. data obtained from the following sources. We use the data of bank lines 
of credit in Sufi (2009).3 The original sample in Sufi (2009) includes 300 randomly 
selected non-financial firms with complete data on lines of credit from 1996 to 2003. 
We use the Compustat database as the data source for the financial variables. We 
obtain data on unionization rates for 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC) 
industries from the Union Membership and Coverage Database.4  We merge the data 
by matching CIC industry codes with SIC industry codes. We exclude observations 
with incomplete data. The final sample consists of 291 firms with 1773 firm-year 
observations. 
 
(ii) Variables 
We describe the variables in this section.   
 
(a) Bargaining Power of Labor Unions 
We use the variable Union Coverage as a measure of the bargaining power of labor 
unions. Union Coverage is defined as the fraction of total workers in an industry who 
are covered by labor unions in collective bargaining. A higher union coverage 
indicates that the labor unions have a higher bargaining power. 
                                                 
3
 The data were publicly available from Sufi’s webpage (http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/amir.sufi/) when 
we wrote the first draft of the paper. Sufi (2009) collects the data for both a random sample with 
complete data and a larger sample with only a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has lines of 
credit. 
4
 The database is maintained by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson and was publicly available at the 
website www.unionstats.com when we wrote the first draft of the paper.   
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(b) The Forms of Corporate Liquidity 
We use the ratio of bank lines of credit to the sum of bank lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings as a measure of a firm’s choice of the forms of corporate 
liquidity (e.g., Sufi, 2009; Yun, 2009).  Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) is the 
ratio of unused lines of credit to the sum of unused lines of credit and corporate cash 
holdings, where corporate cash holdings are defined as cash plus marketable securities 
(e.g., Opler et al., 1999). Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) is the ratio of total lines of 
credit to the sum of total lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. 
 
(c) Control Variables 
We use the following control variables in the regressions (e.g., Sufi, 2009). Size is the 
logarithm of non-cash assets, where non-cash assets are total assets less corporate 
cash holdings. M/B is defined as the book value of non-cash assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of non-cash 
assets. Net Worth is defined as assets minus total liabilities divided by non-cash assets. 
Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. Leverage is the 
ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard 
deviation of Cash Flow in the prior 20 years. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by 2-digit SIC 
codes in the prior 20 years. Over the Counter Dummy is a dummy variable that equals 
one if a firm’s equity trades only over the counter and equals zero otherwise. Not in 
an S&P Index Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is not included in 
one of the main S&P indices and equals zero otherwise. Firm Age is approximated by 
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the number of years a firm is available on Compustat. Table 1 presents univariate 
statistics. We winsorize the data to reduce the impact of outliers. 
 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 In this section, we discuss the methodologies used to address the potential 
endogeneity problem. 
 
(i) The Potential Endogeneity Problem  
One may construct an argument that reverse causality exists, resulting in a potential 
endogeneity problem. For example, suppose a firm holds a higher fraction of 
corporate liquidity in the form of bank lines of credit. The workers may be concerned 
that when these bank lines of credit become unavailable (e.g., during an economic 
downturn), the firm will have a shortage of corporate liquidity and will fire workers to 
reduce expenditures. Consequently, more workers will join the labor unions to protect 
themselves, resulting in a higher bargaining power of labor unions. In this argument, 
the causality is the other way around.  
 
(ii) Instrumental Variables 
We use the instrumental variables approach (e.g., Greene, 1997) with two-stage least 
squares estimation (2SLS) to address the potential endogeneity problem. 5  In our 
research setting, instrumental variables are those variables that directly affect the 
bargaining power of labor unions but do not directly affect a firm’s choice of the 
forms of corporate liquidity.   
                                                 
5
 The instrumental variables approach can also address the potential endogeneity problem stemming 
from the omitted variables when one cannot exhaust all the control variables in a regression. 
 13
The labor economics literature has shown that both the gender (e.g., Hirsch, 1980; 
Hirsch, 1982) and age (e.g., Scoville, 1971) of workers affect the demand for union 
services. We follow the literature (e.g., Chen, Kacperczyk and Ortiz-Molina, 2011) 
and use these two variables as instrumental variables. 
  
(a) The Gender of the Workers 
The workers’ gender variable is called Fraction of Female Workers and is defined as 
the fraction of female workers in the industry a firm belongs to, where the industry is 
classified by the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC) codes. 
 
(b) The Age of the Workers 
The workers’ age variable is called Average Age of the Workers and is defined as the 
average age of the workers in the industry a firm belongs to, where industry is 
classified by 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC) codes.   
We collect the data on gender and age from the Current Population Survey. To our 
knowledge, no theory has been proposed in the literature to directly link the gender or 
age of workers to a firm’s choice of the forms of corporate liquidity.   
 
(iii) The Validity of the Instruments and the Specification 
After we choose these instrumental variables, we use a series of tests to examine the 
validity of our instrumental variables and the specification.  
 
(a) The Relevance of the Instruments 
We examine the relevance of the instruments to determine whether they are weak. 
One way to detect weak instruments is to conduct a first-stage F-test on the null 
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hypothesis that the instruments are jointly zero (or a partial F-test in the presence of 
other control variables). Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) develop the benchmarks for 
the necessary size of the F-statistic. If the first-stage F-statistic (or partial F-statistic) 
is below these critical values, the instrumental variables are regarded as weak 
instruments. 
     We also examine the first-stage partial R2, which measures the strength of the 
instrumental variables (e.g., Shea, 1997). A higher partial R2 represents stronger 
instrumental variables, although there is no formal critical value for this test statistic. 
 
(b) The Exogeneity of the Instruments 
A common critique of the instrumental variables approach is that the instruments can 
be correlated with omitted variables. For example, the gender or age of the workers 
can be correlated with some omitted firm or industry characteristics, while the latter 
can affect a firm’s choice of the forms of corporate liquidity. In this case, these 
omitted variables are at the root of the link between the unionization rate and the 
forms of corporate liquidity.  
     This type of critique questions whether the instruments are endogenous. One way 
to address this concern is to conduct the over-identifying restrictions test to examine 
the exogeneity of the instruments. The null hypothesis is that the instrumental 
variables are valid. Large p-values (i.e., an insignificant test statistic) indicate that the 
instrumental variables are exogenous.6 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Although we have conducted the over-identifying restrictions test, we recognize that our instrumental 
variables might be related to the industry to which a firm belongs, and given that unionization is also an 
industry-level object, this might obscure the identification. This is a potential limitation of our study. In 
Section 5.(vi), we conduct the analysis based on right-to-work legislation. This can provide some 
remedy for the identification. 
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(c) The Existence of the Endogeneity Problem 
We also conduct the Hausman (1978) test. The Hausman test examines the 
differences between the OLS estimates and the 2SLS estimates. A low p-value (i.e., a 
significant test statistic) suggests that the endogeneity problem exists and that the 
2SLS estimates are more consistent than the OLS estimates. 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
We report the results in this section. We begin by demonstrating the univariate 
analysis. We then report the regressions and investigate the difference in the relation 
between the unionization rate and the forms of corporate liquidity in the sub-groups. 
 
(i) Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 shows the univariate analysis. We sort firms into quartiles according to the 
level of Union Coverage in year t-1 and report the mean of the variables Unused 
Line/(Unused Line + Cash) and Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) in each quartile. We 
find that the mean of Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) is 0.5673 in the 1st quartile, 
which includes observations with the highest union coverage. This mean is 0.3585 in 
the 4th quartile, which includes observations with the lowest union coverage.  
Moreover, there is a decreasing trend for the variable Unused Line/(Unused Line + 
Cash) from the 1st quartile to the 4th quartile. We conduct a t-test on the difference 
between the means of the 1st and 4th quartiles and find that the difference is 
significant at the 1% level. Table 2 also shows a similar pattern for the variable Total 
Line/(Total Line + Cash). 
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     The results in Table 2 imply that firms with higher union coverage hold a higher 
fraction of corporate liquidity in the form of bank lines of credit. This is consistent 
with Hypothesis 1, which predicts a positive relation between the unionization rate 
and the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of bank lines of credit.  
 
(ii) First-stage Regression 
Table 3 shows the first-stage regression of the 2SLS estimation. The dependent 
variable is Union Coverage in year t-1. The independent variables are two 
instrumental variables and other control variables in year t-1.7 We follow Sufi (2009) 
and include industry dummy variables defined by 1-digit SIC codes in the regression. 
We also include year dummy variables to control for time effects. We find that the 
coefficient of the instrumental variable Fraction of Female Workerst-1 is -0.159 and 
that the coefficient of the instrumental variable Average Age of the Workerst-1 is 
0.018. Both are significant at the 1% level. The partial F-statistic is 65.79 (p = 0.01), 
indicating that the instruments are not weak. The partial R2 is 0.15, indicating that the 
instrumental variables have a reasonable strength. 
 
(iii) Labor Unions and the Forms of Corporate Liquidity 
Table 4 shows the regressions for the relation between labor unions and the forms of 
corporate liquidity. We follow Sufi (2009) and use one-year lagged variables as 
independent variables in the regressions. We show both the OLS regressions and the 
second stage of the 2SLS estimation in this table.   
The dependent variable is Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) in Columns 1 and 2. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Union Coverage
 t-1 is 0.167 (p = 0.05) in the 
                                                 
7
 There is no lagging in Table 3 because both the dependent variable and the independent variables are 
in year t-1. We run the first-stage regression with the variables in year t-1, because we will use the 
lagged independent variables in the second stage of the 2SLS estimation. 
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OLS estimation. Column 2 shows that this coefficient is 1.208 (p = 0.01) in the 
second stage of the 2SLS estimation. We conduct the over-identifying restrictions test 
and find that the F-statistic is 0.49, with an insignificant p-value of 0.48, which 
implies that the instrumental variables are exogenous and valid. We conduct the 
Hausman test and find that the F-statistic is 10.73 (p = 0.01), which means there is a 
significant difference between the OLS estimates and the 2SLS estimates and that it is 
more proper to draw implications based on the 2SLS estimates due to the existence of 
the endogeneity problem.  
     We take the coefficients in Column 2 to illustrate the economic magnitude of the 
results. Column 2 shows that the coefficient of Union Coveraget-1 is 1.208 and is 
statistically significant (p = 0.01).  Table 1 shows that the standard deviation of the 
variable Union Coveraget-1 is 0.1196, which implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in the variable Union Coveraget-1 leads to a 14.48% increase (= 1.208 * 
0.1196) in the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of unused lines of credit. 
In our sample, the mean of the sum of unused lines of credit and corporate cash 
holdings is 256.92 million dollars. Therefore, the 14.48% increase in the fraction of 
corporate liquidity held in the form of unused lines of credit corresponds to a dollar 
value of 37.20 million dollars (= 14.48% * 256.92).  This implies that the impact of 
union coverage on a firm’s choice of the forms of corporate liquidity is economically 
significant. 
We find a similar pattern in the results in Columns 3 and 4, where the dependent 
variable is Total Line/(Total Line + Cash). Column 3 shows that the coefficient of 
Union Coverage is 0.169 (p = 0.08) in the OLS estimation. Column 4 shows that this 
coefficient is 1.407 (p = 0.01) in the second stage of the 2SLS estimation. The over-
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identifying restrictions test and the Hausman test show that it is more proper to draw 
implications based on the 2SLS estimates. 
  Therefore, the results in Table 4 are consistent with the interpretation that firms 
hold more corporate liquidity in the form of bank lines of credit in the presence of 
stronger labor unions.  The results support Hypothesis 1. 
 
(iv) Union Coverage and the Level of Bank Lines of Credit 
Klasa et al. (2009) find that firms with stronger labor unions have lower corporate 
cash holdings.  Our use of Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) and Total Line/(Total 
Line + Cash) as the measures of the forms of corporate liquidity allows an alternative 
explanation that the findings are driven by the reduction in corporate cash holdings 
instead of the increase in bank lines of credit because corporate cash holdings appear 
in the denominator of the measures. To examine this alternative interpretation, we 
investigate whether the unionization rate directly affects the level of bank lines of 
credit.  
 Table 5 shows the results. We report the second stage of the 2SLS estimation. 
The dependent variables in this table are the level of bank lines of credit. Unused 
Lines of Credit is the ratio of unused lines of credit to assets, and Total Lines of 
Credit is the ratio of total lines of credit to assets. Column 1 shows that the coefficient 
of Union Coveraget-1 is 0.170 (p = 0.07), which implies that firms have a higher level 
of unused lines of credit in the presence of stronger labor unions. We find a similar 
pattern in Column 2, which shows the regression for Total Lines of Credit. 
     We examine whether the economic magnitude of the coefficients in Table 5 is 
consistent with the economic magnitude of the coefficients in Table 4. We take the 
coefficient in Column 1 of Table 5 as an example.  Column 1 shows that the 
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coefficient of Union Coveraget-1 is 0.170 and is statistically significant (p = 0.07), 
which implies that a one standard deviation increase in the variable Union Coveraget-1 
leads to a 2.03% increase (= 0.170 * 0.1196) in the level of unused lines of credit. In 
our sample, the mean of total assets is 1516.25 million dollars. Therefore, the 2.03% 
increase in the level of unused lines of credit corresponds to a dollar value of 30.78 
million dollars (= 2.03% * 1516.25). This implies that the coefficients in Table 5 have 
a similar economic magnitude as the coefficients in Table 4.  
     Therefore, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the interpretation that the 
unionization rate directly increases a firm’s holding of bank lines of credit. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
 
(v) Industry-level Analysis 
Because our unionization data are at the industry level, industries with more firms will 
receive a larger weight in the regressions in Table 4. We therefore conduct an 
industry-level analysis by giving each industry an equal weight. We convert all firm-
level variables into industry-level variables each year by taking the average of the 
variables across the industries classified by 3-digit Census Industry Classification 
(CIC) codes. We exclude observations where a firm is the only firm in an industry in 
our sample to avoid mixing industry-level data with firm-level data.  
Table 6 shows the results. We report the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS 
estimation. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Union Coveraget-1 is 1.012 (p = 
0.01) in the regression for Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash). We find a similar 
pattern in Column 2, which shows the regression for Total Line/(Total Line + Cash). 
Therefore, the results of the industry-level analysis in Table 6 are similar to those 
of the firm-level analysis in Table 4 and thus support Hypothesis 1, which predicts a 
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positive relation between the unionization rate and the fraction of corporate liquidity 
held in the form of bank lines of credit.  
 
(vi) Right-to-work Legislation 
We investigate how right-to-work legislation affects the relation between the 
unionization rate and the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of bank lines 
of credit.  We obtain the data on the status of right-to-work legislation in each state 
from the website of the United States Department of Labor.8  The state in which 
employees work determines whether right-to-work legislation governs their 
employment.9 We use the “State” variable in Compustat to determine in which state a 
firm has the majority of its operations (e.g., Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina, 
2009).10 We divide the sample into two sub-groups depending on whether a firm is in 
a state with right-to-work legislation. We estimate the regressions separately for these 
two sub-groups. 
Table 7 shows the results. We report the second stage of the 2SLS estimation in 
Panel A. Columns 1 and 2 show the regressions for Unused Line/(Unused Line + 
Cash). Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Union Coveraget-1 is 1.170 (p = 0.01) 
for the sub-group of firms that are not in a state with right-to-work legislation. 
Column 2 shows that this coefficient is 0.203 (p = 0.78) for the sub-group of firms 
that are in a state with right-to-work legislation. We conduct a t-test of the difference 
in the coefficients of Union Coverage t-1 between the two sub-groups separated by the 
                                                 
8
 The information on the status of right-to-work legislation in each state is publicly available at the 
website of the United States Department of Labor (http://www.dol.gov). 
9
 For example, the Constitution of the State of Florida states that “The right of persons to work shall 
not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor 
organization.” (Article I, Section 6). And the Florida Statues states that “The term “labor organization” 
means any organization of employees or local or subdivision thereof, having within its membership 
residents of the state, whether incorporated or not, …… shall be included in this definition ……” 
(Chapter 447.02). See the website of the Florida Legislature (http://www.leg.state.fl.us). 
10
 See Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009), p427-p428. 
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status of right-to-work legislation, and report the results in Panel B. We find that the 
difference is significant (p = 0.01). We find a similar pattern in Columns 3 and 4 for 
the regressions for Total Line/(Total Line + Cash).   
     Therefore, the results in Table 7 imply that there is a positive relation (no relation) 
between the unionization rate and the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form 
of bank lines of credit for firms that are not in (are in) a state with right-to-work 
legislation. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
 
(a) Robustness Check 
A potential limitation of the analysis on right-to-work legislation is that the variable 
“State” in Compustat is measured with noise (e.g., Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina, 
2009). 11  Because a firm’s state of operation can be different from its state of 
incorporation, it is possible that some employees of the firm do not work in the state 
as identified by the “State” variable in Compustat. This can reduce the power of the 
analysis based on right-to-work legislation.  
We conduct the robustness check in this section. We collect data on a firm’s state 
of incorporation from Compustat. Then, we obtain a sub-sample of firms whose state 
of operation is the same as the state of incorporation.  This sub-sample includes 532 
firm-year observations. Because the state of operation is the same as the state of 
incorporation for the firms in this sub-sample, it is more likely that most of their 
employees work in the state identified by the “State” variable in Compustat.  This can 
mitigate concern over the potential limitation. 
     In the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for Unused Line/(Unused 
Line + Cash), the coefficient of Union Coveraget-1 is 1.149 (p = 0.03) for the sub-
                                                 
11
 See Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina (2009), p428. 
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group of firms that are not in a state with right-to-work legislation, and this coefficient 
is -0.058 (p = 0.96) for the sub-group of firms that are in a state with right-to-work 
legislation. A t-test shows a significant difference (p = 0.01) in these coefficients 
between the two sub-groups separated by the status of right-to-work legislation. We 
find a similar pattern in the regressions for Total Line/(Total Line + Cash).  Therefore, 
we find similar results when we use a sub-sample of firms whose state of operation is 
the same as the state of incorporation. 12 
 
(b) Heckman Two-stage Estimation 
Because a firm may choose the state of operation or the state of incorporation, we 
apply the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation to mitigate this self-selection 
problem. We conduct the analysis for the sub-sample of firms whose state of 
operation is the same as the state of incorporation because using this sub-sample can 
mitigate the potential limitation regarding the difference in the state of operation and 
the state of incorporation as discussed above.  
     In the first stage, we estimate a probit regression to model a firm’s decision on 
whether to incorporate/operate in a state with right-to-work legislation. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is incorporated and operated in 
a state with right-to-work legislation and equals zero otherwise. The independent 
variables are motivated by Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) and include the logarithm of 
sales, market-to-book ratio, ROA, the logarithm of the number of employees, two 
dummy variables indicating when a firm went public, industry dummy variables for 
industries defined by 2-digit SIC codes13 . Because we focus on labor law while 
                                                 
12
 These results are not tabulated but are available on request. 
13
 See the specification in Table 8 of Bebchuk and Cohen (2003, p403). Because we conduct the 
analysis for the sub-sample of firms whose state of operation is the same as the state of incorporation, 
we do not include the state dummy variables in the probit regression.  
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Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) focus on corporate law, we add labor intensity as an 
additional independent variable in the regression. Moreover, we include all the 
second-stage variables (except for Lambda) in the first stage as a standard procedure 
of the Heckman two-stage estimation.  
     We obtain Lambda from the probit estimates. The calculation of Lambda follows 
the standard Heckman methodology. Among the independent variables, we find that a 
firm is more likely to incorporate/operate in a state with right-to-work legislation if 
the firm has more employees or a higher labor intensity. This is consistent with the 
interpretation that a firm is more motivated to take advantage of right-to-work 
legislation to weaken the bargaining power of labor if the firm has more employees or 
a higher labor intensity. 
     In the second stage, we estimate the regressions with Lambda as an additional 
control variable. This provides the treatment for the self-selection problem. In the 
second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for Unused Line/(Unused Line + 
Cash), the coefficient of Union Coveraget-1 is 1.275 (p = 0.01) for the sub-group of 
firms that are not in a state with right-to-work legislation, and this coefficient is 0.015 
(p = 0.98) for the sub-group of firms that are in a state with right-to-work legislation. 
A t-test shows a significant difference (p = 0.01) in these coefficients between the two 
sub-groups separated by status of right-to-work legislation. We find a similar pattern 
in the regressions for Total Line/(Total Line + Cash).  Therefore, we find similar 
results after we use the Heckman two-stage estimation to control for the self-selection 
problem.14 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
14
 These results are not tabulated but are available on request. 
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(c) Labor Costs and Operating Profitability 
In this section, we examine whether there is a difference in the impact of the forms of 
corporate liquidity on labor costs and operating profitability between the states with or 
without right-to-work legislation. This can provide further evidence on the 
consequence of the bargaining effect associated with bank lines of credit. 
     We first examine labor costs. If a firm holds a higher fraction of corporate liquidity 
in the form of bank lines of credit (i.e., a lower fraction of corporate liquidity in the 
form of corporate cash holdings), then the firm’s labor costs will be lower because of 
the bargaining benefits associated with bank lines of credit. We expect that the 
negative relation between the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of bank 
lines of credit and labor costs is stronger (weaker) for firms that are not in (are in) a 
state with right-to-work legislation. 
     We obtain a sub-sample of firms whose data on labor costs are available in 
Compustat.  This sub-sample includes 133 firm-year observations. 15   We follow 
Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) and define labor costs as average employee 
pay, which is calculated as staff expenses divided by the number of employees. In the 
regressions, the dependent variable is the logarithm of average employee pay. The 
independent variables include the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of 
bank lines of credit and other control variables. The control variables are motivated by 
Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) and include size, leverage, average sales per 
employee, market-to-book ratio, and tangibility. 
                                                 
15
 The size of this sub-sample is much smaller because in the US the disclosure of labor costs is 
voluntary (e.g., Lajili and Zeghal, 2005), and the data are only available for a small fraction of firms. 
For example, Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) state that “Compustat provides “labor and related 
expenses” (data item 42) …… About 10% of firms recorded in Compustat have valid information on 
data item 42”. See Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013), p482. 
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     In the regressions for the logarithm of average employee pay, the coefficient of 
Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) is -0.510 (p = 0.04) for the sub-group of firms 
that are not in a state with right-to-work legislation, and this coefficient is 0.006 (p = 
0.97) for the sub-group of firms that are in a state with right-to-work legislation. A t-
test shows a significant difference (p = 0.03) in these coefficients between the two 
sub-groups separated by status of right-to-work legislation. We find a similar pattern 
when we use Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) as the measure of the fraction of 
corporate liquidity held in the form of bank lines of credit.  Therefore, the results are 
consistent with the interpretation that there is a negative relation (no relation) between 
the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of bank lines of credit and labor 
costs for firms that are not in (are in) a state with right-to-work legislation.16 
     Next, we examine operating profitability. If a firm holds a higher fraction of 
corporate liquidity in the form of bank lines of credit (i.e., a lower fraction of 
corporate liquidity in the form of corporate cash holdings), then the firm’s operating 
profitability will be higher because of the bargaining benefits associated with bank 
lines of credit. We expect that the positive relation between the fraction of corporate 
liquidity held in the form of bank lines of credit and operating profitability is stronger 
(weaker) for firms that are not in (are in) a state with right-to-work legislation. 
     We use ROA as the measure of operating profitability. We define ROA as the ratio 
of EBIT to non-cash assets. 17  The independent variables include the fraction of 
corporate liquidity held in the form of bank lines of credit and other control variables. 
The control variables include size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, capital 
expenditures, tangibility, and lagged ROA in year t-1. These variables are commonly 
used in the literature as determinants of ROA. 
                                                 
16
 These results are not tabulated but are available on request. 
17
 We obtain similar results when we define ROA as the ratio of EBIT to assets. We also obtain similar 
results when we use the ratio of EBIT to sales as the measure of operating profitability. 
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     In the regressions for ROA, the coefficient of Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) 
is 0.055 (p = 0.01) for the sub-group of firms that are not in a state with right-to-work 
legislation, and this coefficient is 0.016 (p = 0.39) for the sub-group of firms that are 
in a state with right-to-work legislation. A t-test shows a significant difference (p = 
0.03) in these coefficients between the two sub-groups separated by status of right-to-
work legislation. We find a similar pattern when we use Total Line/(Total Line + 
Cash) as the measure of the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of bank 
lines of credit.  Therefore, the results are consistent with the interpretation that there is 
a positive relation (no relation) between the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the 
form of bank lines of credit and operating profitability for firms that are not in (are in) 
a state with right-to-work legislation.18 
 
(vii) Financial Constraints 
We investigate how financial constraints affect the relation between the unionization 
rate and the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of bank lines of credit. We 
follow the literature and use two measures of financial constraints. First, we use 
payout defined as the ratio of the sum of dividends and stock repurchases to total 
assets. We divide the sample into two sub-groups depending on the level of payout. A 
firm is financially constrained (unconstrained) if lagged payout is below (above) the 
median. Second, we divide the sample into two sub-groups depending on whether a 
firm has credit ratings. We obtain credit ratings data from Compustat. A firm is 
financially unconstrained (constrained) if the firm has either (neither) a bond rating or 
(nor) a commercial paper rating. We estimate the regressions separately for the 
financially unconstrained and constrained sub-groups. 
                                                 
18
 These results are not tabulated but are available on request. 
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Table 8 shows the results. Panel A shows the regressions when we separate the 
sample by payout. We report the second stage of the 2SLS estimation. Columns 1 and 
2 show the regressions for Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash). Column 1 shows that 
the coefficient of Union Coveraget-1 is 1.763 (p = 0.04) for the sub-group of 
financially constrained firms. Column 2 shows that this coefficient is 0.430 (p = 0.20) 
for the sub-group of financially unconstrained firms. A t-test reported in Panel B 
shows a significant difference (p = 0.05) in these coefficients between the two sub-
groups separated by payout. We find a similar pattern in Columns 3 and 4 for the 
regressions for Total Line/(Total Line + Cash).   
Panel C shows the regressions when we separate the sample by whether a firm has 
credit ratings. We report the second stage of the 2SLS estimation. Columns 1 and 2 
show the regressions for Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash). Column 1 shows that 
the coefficient of Union Coveraget-1 is 2.082 (p = 0.01) for the sub-group of 
financially constrained firms. Column 2 shows that this coefficient is -0.077 (p = 0.78) 
for the sub-group of financially unconstrained firms. A t-test reported in Panel D 
shows a significant difference (p = 0.01) in these coefficients between the two sub-
groups separated by the availability of credit rating. We find a similar pattern in 
Columns 3 and 4 for the regressions for Total Line/(Total Line + Cash).   
     Therefore, the results in Table 8 imply that there is a positive relation (no relation) 
between the unionization rate and the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form 
of bank lines of credit for financially constrained (unconstrained) firms. These results 
are consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
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(viii) Robustness Checks 
We conduct robustness checks in this section. We examine an alternative explanation 
related to labor intensity.  Then, we conduct the analysis using union membership as 
an alternative measure of the bargaining power of labor unions. 
 
(a) Labor Intensity 
Klasa et al. (2009) argue that a lower union coverage can indicate lower labor 
intensity instead of less union bargaining power in some industries. A firm with lower 
labor intensity may have higher asset tangibility because the firm can be in a capital-
intensive rather than a labor-intensive industry. This can facilitate the firm in 
obtaining more bank lines of credit. Therefore, an alternative explanation is that 
because unionization rate may proxy for labor intensity, the observed effect of the 
unionization rate on the forms of corporate liquidity can stem from the impact of labor 
intensity instead of collective bargaining. 
We examine this alternative explanation by dividing the sample into two sub-
groups based on the level of a firm’s labor intensity, and we investigate whether there 
is a difference in the impact of unionization rate on the forms of corporate liquidity 
between these two sub-groups.  We use the ratio of a firm’s number of employees to 
assets as the measure of labor intensity.  We divide the sample into two sub-groups 
depending on whether labor intensity in year t-1 is below or above the median. We 
estimate the regressions separately for these two sub-groups. If the observed impact of 
unionization rate on the forms of corporate liquidity is (is not) solely due to the 
impact of labor intensity, we should not (should) find a significant impact of union 
coverage on the forms of corporate liquidity after controlling for the labor intensity. 
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Table 9 shows the results. We report the second stage of the 2SLS estimation in 
Panel A. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Union Coveraget-1 is 1.147 (p = 0.01) 
for the sub-group of firms with lower labor intensity, and Column 2 shows that this 
coefficient is 1.043 (p = 0.04) for the sub-group of firms with higher labor intensity. 
A t-test reported in Panel B shows an insignificant difference (p = 0.78) in the 
coefficients of Union Coveraget-1 between the two sub-groups separated by the labor 
intensity. We find a similar pattern in Columns 3 and 4 for the regressions for Total 
Line/(Total Line + Cash). 
Therefore, after controlling for the labor intensity, we still find a significant 
impact of unionization rate on a firm’s choice of the forms of corporate liquidity, 
which implies that our findings are not driven by labor intensity. 
 
(b) Union Membership 
We repeat the analysis, using union membership as an alternative measure of the 
bargaining power of labor unions. Union membership is the fraction of total workers 
in an industry who are members of labor unions.  Table 1 shows that union coverage 
is higher than union membership, indicating that collective bargaining covers some 
workers who are not members of labor unions. We use the same specification as in 
Table 4 and replace the union coverage with the union membership. The results are 
consistent with the interpretation that firms hold more corporate liquidity in the form 
of bank lines of credit in the presence of stronger labor unions. Therefore, we find 
similar results when we use union membership as an alternative measure of the 
bargaining power of labor unions.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
We examine how the presence of labor unions affects a firm’s choice of the forms of 
corporate liquidity between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings.  We use 
the unionization rate to measure the bargaining power of labor unions, and we use the 
ratio of bank lines of credit to the sum of bank lines of credit and corporate cash 
holdings as a measure of a firm’s choice of the forms of corporate liquidity. We use 
instrumental variables with two-stage least squares estimation. 
We find that firms in industries with higher unionization rates hold a higher 
fraction of corporate liquidity in the form of bank lines of credit. We divide the firms 
into sub-groups and find that this positive relationship holds for firms that are not in a 
state with right-to-work legislation and for firms that are financially constrained. We 
conduct robustness checks and find similar results when we control for labor intensity 
and when we use the union membership as an alternative measure of the bargaining 
power of labor unions. 
Therefore, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that a firm chooses the 
forms of corporate liquidity to take advantage of the bargaining benefits associated 
with bank lines of credit. 
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Table 1 
Univariate Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median 25th Percentile 
75th 
Percentile Std. Dev. 
Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) 0.4559 0.4665 0.0000 0.8297 0.3750 
Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 0.5170 0.5886 0.0000 0.9033 0.3894 
Unused Lines of Credit 0.1030 0.0697 0.0000 0.1515 0.1253 
Total Lines of Credit 0.1577 0.1138 0.0000 0.2453 0.1581 
Corporate Cash Holdings 0.1894 0.0803 0.0208 0.2822 0.2314 
Union Coverage t-1 0.1167 0.0800 0.0330 0.1500 0.1196 
Union Membership t-1 0.1077 0.0740 0.0280 0.1380 0.1163 
Size t-1 18.7380 18.7468 17.1287 20.2452 2.3309 
M/B t-1 3.6161 1.5033 1.0700 2.7319 7.1529 
Net Worth t-1 0.4361 0.4544 0.2868 0.6365 0.2856 
Tangibility t-1 0.6310 0.5357 0.2963 0.8450 0.4864 
Cash Flow t-1 0.0618 0.1261 0.0420 0.1951 0.2886 
Leverage t-1 0.1677 0.1067 0.0006 0.2925 0.1827 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.2624 0.0859 0.0424 0.2143 0.4753 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.0490 0.0446 0.0297 0.0576 0.0260 
Over the Counter Dummy t-1 0.1562 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3632 
Not in an S&P Index Dummy t-1 0.6887 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4632 
Firm Age t-1 15.5742 10.0000 5.0000 24.0000 13.6507 
Fraction of Female Workers t-1 0.3595 0.3420 0.2410 0.4470 0.1582 
Average Age of the Workers t-1 39.5563 40.0924 39.8021 40.3123 1.5047 
 
Notes:  
This table shows the univariate statistics. We use a sample of 1773 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2003. 
Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) is the ratio of unused lines of credit to the sum of unused lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings, where corporate cash holdings are the sum of cash and marketable securities. Total 
Line/(Total Line + Cash) is the ratio of total lines of credit to the sum of total lines of credit and corporate cash 
holdings. Unused Lines of Credit is the ratio of unused lines of credit to assets. Total Lines of Credit is the ratio 
of total lines of credit to assets. Corporate Cash Holdings is defined as the ratio of the sum of cash and 
marketable securities to assets. Union Coverage is the fraction of total workers in an industry who are covered 
by labor unions in the collective bargaining, where the industries are based on the 3-digit Census Industry 
Classification (CIC). Union Membership is the fraction of total workers in an industry who are members of 
labor unions. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets, where non-cash assets are total assets less corporate cash 
holdings. M/B is defined as the book value of non-cash assets minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of non-cash assets. Net Worth is defined as assets minus total 
liabilities divided by non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-
term debts to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of Cash Flow in the prior 20 years. 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by 
2-digit SIC codes in the prior 20 years. Over the Counter Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a 
firm’s equity trades only over the counter and equals zero otherwise. Not in an S&P Index Dummy is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a firm is not included in one of the main S&P indices and equals zero otherwise. Firm 
Age is approximated by the number of years a firm is available on Compustat. Fraction of Female Workers is 
the fraction of female workers in the industry a firm belongs to. Average Age of the Workers is the average age 
of the workers in the industry a firm belongs to. 
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Table 2 
 Univariate Analysis of Union Coverage and the Forms of Corporate Liquidity 
 
 
 Union Coverage t-1  
 
1st Quartile 
 
 
2nd Quartile 
 
 
3rd Quartile 4th Quartile Difference between the 1st 
Quartile and the 4th Quartile 
(p-value of the mean test) 
Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) 
 
0.5673 
 
0.4850 
 
0.4151 
 
0.3585 
 
0.2088*** 
(0.01) 
Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
 
0.6218 
 
0.5452 
 
0.4729 
 
0.4299 
 
0.1919*** 
(0.01) 
 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the univariate analysis of union coverage and the forms of corporate liquidity. We use a sample of 1773 
firm-year observations from 1996 to 2003. Union Coverage is the fraction of total workers in an industry who are covered by 
labor unions in the collective bargaining, where the industries are based on the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC). 
We divide the observations into quartiles based on the level of union coverage in year t-1. 1st Quartile includes the 
observations with the highest union coverage. 4th Quartile includes the observations with the lowest union coverage. Unused 
Line/(Unused Line + Cash) is the ratio of unused lines of credit to the sum of unused lines of credit and corporate cash 
holdings, where corporate cash holdings is the sum of cash and marketable securities. Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) is the 
ratio of total lines of credit to the sum of total lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. We report the mean of the variables 
and the p-value of the mean test in the table. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 3 
 First-stage Regression 
 
Model:   Union Coveragei, t-1 = a + b1 * Fraction of Female Workersi, t-1  + b2 * Average Age of the Workersi, t-1  + b3 * Sizei, t-1 + b4 * M/Bi, t-1      
                                                                     
+ b5 * Net Worthi, t-1  + b6 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b7  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b8 * Leveragei, t-1  + b9 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                     
+ b10 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1 + b11 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1 + b12 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1  
                                               + b13 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t-1 
 
 
 Union Coverage t-1 
Intercept -0.592*** 
 (0.01) 
Fraction of Female Workers t-1 -0.159*** 
 (0.01) 
Average Age of the Workers t-1 0.018*** 
 (0.01) 
Size t-1 0.003** 
 (0.04) 
M/B t-1 -0.001*** 
 (0.01) 
Net Worth t-1 -0.034*** 
 (0.01) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.001 
 (0.90) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.012 
 (0.17) 
Leverage t-1 0.004 
 (0.75) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.001 
 (0.95) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -1.070*** 
 (0.01) 
Over the Counter Dummy t-1 0.033*** 
 (0.01) 
Not in an S&P Index Dummy t-1 -0.012** 
 (0.02) 
Firm Age t-1 0.001*** 
 (0.01) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Observations 1773 
Adjusted R2 0.56 
Partial F-statistic F = 65.79  (p = 0.01) 
Partial R2 0.15 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the first-stage regression of the 2SLS estimation. We use a sample of 1773 firm-year observations from 1996 to 
2003. Union Coverage is the fraction of total workers in an industry who are covered by labor unions in the collective bargaining, 
where the industries are based on the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC). Fraction of Female Workers is the fraction of 
female workers in the industry a firm belongs to, where the industry is classified by the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC) 
codes. Average Age of the Workers is the average age of the workers in the industry a firm belongs to, where the industry is 
classified by the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC) codes. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets, where non-cash assets 
are total assets less corporate cash holdings. M/B is defined as the book value of non-cash assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity divided by the book value of non-cash assets. Net Worth is defined as assets minus total liabilities divided 
by non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the 
standard deviation of Cash Flow in the prior 20 years. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the median of Cash 
Flow in an industry classified by 2-digit SIC codes in the prior 20 years. Over the Counter Dummy is a dummy variable that equals 
one if a firm’s equity trades only over the counter and equals zero otherwise. Not in an S&P Index Dummy is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a firm is not included in one of the main S&P indices and equals zero otherwise. Firm Age is approximated by the 
number of years that a firm is available on Compustat. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for industries defined by 
1-digit SIC codes and are not reported in the table. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and 
are not reported in the table. The p-value is in parentheses. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
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Table 4 
 Second-stage Regressions: Union Coverage and the Forms of Corporate Liquidity 
 
 
Model 1:   Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash)i, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Sizei, t-1 + b3 * M/Bi, t-1  + b4 * Net Worthi, t-1   
                                                                                                                          
+ b5 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b6  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Leveragei, t-1   
                                                                                 + b8 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  + b9 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                                                                         
+ b10 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1   
                                                                                 + b12 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
 
Model 2:   Total Line/(Total Line + Cash)i, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Sizei, t-1 + b3 * M/Bi, t-1  + b4 * Net Worthi, t-1   
                                                                                                            
+ b5 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b6  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Leveragei, t-1   
                                                                        + b8 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  + b9 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                                                            
+ b10 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1   
                                                                        + b12 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
 
 Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
 
Model 1: 
OLS 
Model 1: 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
Model 2: 
OLS 
Model 2: 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
Intercept -0.533*** -0.457*** -0.447*** -0.488*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Coverage t-1 0.167** 1.208*** 0.169* 1.407*** 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) 
Size t-1 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Worth t-1 0.043 0.087*** 0.028 0.078** 
 (0.16) (0.01) (0.37) (0.03) 
Tangibility t-1 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.037** 0.041** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.037 0.052 0.045 0.061* 
 (0.25) (0.12) (0.17) (0.08) 
Leverage t-1 0.319*** 0.333*** 0.429*** 0.445*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.120*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -1.986*** -0.785 -2.369*** -0.906 
 (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.11) 
Over the Counter Dummy t-1 -0.028 -0.067*** 0.003 -0.040 
 (0.20) (0.01) (0.89) (0.13) 
Not in an S&P Index Dummy t-1 0.030 0.043** 0.053*** 0.068*** 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Age t-1 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.56) (0.42) (0.61) (0.05) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1773 1773 1773 1773 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.39 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test  F = 0.49 (p = 0.48)  F = 0.37 (p = 0.54) 
Hausman Test  F = 10.73 (p = 0.01)  F = 15.57 (p = 0.01) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the OLS estimation and the second stage of the 2SLS estimation of the relation 
between the unionization rate and the forms of corporate liquidity. We use a sample of 1773 firm-year 
observations from 1996 to 2003. Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) is the ratio of unused lines of 
credit to the sum of unused lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, where corporate cash holdings 
are the sum of cash and marketable securities. Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) is the ratio of total lines 
of credit to the sum of total lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Union Coverage is the fraction 
of total workers in an industry who are covered by labor unions in the collective bargaining, where the 
industries are based on the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC). Size is the logarithm of non-
cash assets, where non-cash assets are total assets less corporate cash holdings. M/B is defined as the 
book value of non-cash assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by 
the book value of non-cash assets. Net Worth is defined as assets minus total liabilities divided by non-
cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is 
the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debts to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of Cash Flow in the prior 20 
years. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry 
classified by 2-digit SIC codes in the prior 20 years. Over the Counter Dummy is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a firm’s equity trades only over the counter and equals zero otherwise. Not in an S&P 
Index Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is not included in one of the main S&P 
indices and equals zero otherwise. Firm Age is approximated by the number of years that a firm is 
available on Compustat. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for industries defined by 
1-digit SIC codes and are not reported in the table. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the years in the sample and are not reported in the table. The p-value is in parentheses. ***,**, and * 
denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
 Union Coverage and the Level of Bank Lines of Credit 
 
Model 1:   Unused Lines of Crediti, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Sizei, t-1 + b3 * M/Bi, t-1  + b4 * Net Worthi, t-1   
                                                                                          
+ b5 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b6  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Leveragei, t-1   
                                                            + b8 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  + b9 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                                          
+ b10 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1   
                                                            + b12 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
 
Model 2:   Total Lines of Crediti, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Sizei, t-1 + b3 * M/Bi, t-1  + b4 * Net Worthi, t-1   
                                                                                     
+ b5 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b6  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Leveragei, t-1   
                                                        + b8 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  + b9 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                                     
+ b10 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1   
                                                         + b12 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
 
 Unused Lines of Credit Total Lines of Credit 
 
Model 1 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
Model 2 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
Intercept 0.096** 0.141*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Union Coverage t-1 0.170* 0.283* 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
Size t-1 0.001 0.001 
 (0.62) (0.58) 
M/B t-1 -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Worth t-1 0.008 -0.004 
 (0.52) (0.77) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.007 0.003 
 (0.27) (0.76) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.030** 0.047*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Leverage t-1 0.030 0.140*** 
 (0.14) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.037*** -0.054*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.161 -0.574*** 
 (0.34) (0.01) 
Over the Counter Dummy t-1 -0.042*** -0.029*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Not in an S&P Index Dummy t-1 0.009 0.028*** 
 (0.23) (0.01) 
Firm Age t-1 -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Observations 1773 1773 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.20 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test F = 1.72 (p = 0.19) F = 0.24 (p = 0.62) 
Hausman Test F = 3.57 (p = 0.05) F = 4.21 (p = 0.04) 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation of the relation between the 
unionization rate and the level of bank lines of credit. We use a sample of 1773 firm-year observations 
from 1996 to 2003. Unused Lines of Credit is the ratio of unused lines of credit to assets. Total Lines of 
Credit is the ratio of total lines of credit to assets. Union Coverage is the fraction of total workers in an 
industry who are covered by labor unions in the collective bargaining, where the industries are based on 
the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC). Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets, where non-
cash assets are total assets less corporate cash holdings. M/B is defined as the book value of non-cash 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of non-
cash assets. Net Worth is defined as assets minus total liabilities divided by non-cash assets. Tangibility 
is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Cash 
Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of Cash Flow in the prior 20 years. Industry Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by 2-digit SIC 
codes in the prior 20 years. Over the Counter Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s 
equity trades only over the counter and equals zero otherwise. Not in an S&P Index Dummy is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a firm is not included in one of the main S&P indices and equals zero 
otherwise. Firm Age is approximated by the number of years that a firm is available on Compustat. 
Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for industries defined by 1-digit SIC codes and are 
not reported in the table. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample 
and are not reported in the table. The p-value is in parentheses. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
 Union Coverage and the Forms of Corporate Liquidity: Industry-Level Analysis 
 
 
Model 1:   Industry Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash)i, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Industry Sizei, t-1 + b3 * Industry M/Bi, t-1   
                                                                                                                                             
+ b4 * Industry Net Worthi, t-1   + b5 * Industry Tangibilityi, t-1   
                                                                                                                                             
+ b6  * Industry Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Industry Leveragei, t-1   
                                                                                              + b8 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1   
                                                                                                                                             
+ b9 * Industry Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  
                                                                                                                                             
+ b10 * Industry Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Industry Firm Agei, t-1  
                                                                                                                                             
+ Industry Dummy Variables 
 
+ Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
 
Model 2:   Industry Total Line/(Total Line + Cash)i, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Industry Sizei, t-1 + b3 * Industry M/Bi, t-1   
                                                                                                                                 
+ b4 * Industry Net Worthi, t-1   + b5 * Industry Tangibilityi, t-1   
                                                                                                                                 
+ b6  * Industry Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Industry Leveragei, t-1   
                                                                                      + b8 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1   
                                                                                                                                 
+ b9 * Industry Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  
                                                                                                                                 
+ b10 * Industry Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Industry Firm Agei, t-1  
                                                                                                                                 
+ Industry Dummy Variables 
 
+ Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
 
 Industry Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) Industry Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
 
Model 1 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
Model 2 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
Intercept -1.276*** -1.030*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Union Coverage t-1 1.012*** 1.441*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Size t-1 0.081*** 0.076*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry M/B t-1 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.19) (0.45) 
Industry Net Worth t-1 0.345*** 0.417*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Tangibility t-1 0.066 0.083* 
 (0.14) (0.08) 
Industry Cash Flow t-1 0.167** 0.254*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
Industry Leverage t-1 0.386*** 0.646*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -2.149*** -1.759** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Industry Over the Counter Dummy t-1 0.054 0.075 
 (0.35) (0.24) 
Industry Not in an S&P Index Dummy t-1 0.001 0.082 
 (0.99) (0.13) 
Industry Firm Age t-1 -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Observations 360 360 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.46 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test F = 1.48 (p = 0.23) F = 0.13 (p = 0.72) 
Hausman Test F = 26.07 (p = 0.01) F = 33.73 (p = 0.01) 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation on the industry-level analysis. We convert all firm-
level variables into industry-level variables by taking the average of the variables across the industries classified by the        
3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC) codes. The sample includes 360 industry-year observations from 1996 to 2003. 
Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) is the ratio of unused lines of credit to the sum of unused lines of credit and corporate 
cash holdings, where corporate cash holdings are the sum of cash and marketable securities. Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
is the ratio of total lines of credit to the sum of total lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Union Coverage is the 
fraction of total workers in an industry who are covered by labor unions in the collective bargaining, where the industries are 
based on the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC). Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets, where non-cash assets are 
total assets less corporate cash holdings. M/B is defined as the book value of non-cash assets minus the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of non-cash assets. Net Worth is defined as assets minus total 
liabilities divided by non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash 
assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of Cash Flow in the prior 20 years. Over the Counter Dummy is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s equity trades only over the counter and equals zero otherwise. Not in an S&P 
Index Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is not included in one of the main S&P indices and equals zero 
otherwise. Firm Age is approximated by the number of years that a firm is available on Compustat. Industry Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for industries defined by 1-digit SIC codes and are not reported in the table. Year Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and are not reported in the table. The p-value is in parentheses. 
***,**, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 7 
 Sub-groups Separated by Right-to-Work Legislation 
 
 
Model 1:   Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash)i, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Sizei, t-1 + b3 * M/Bi, t-1  + b4 * Net Worthi, t-1   
                                                                                                                          
+ b5 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b6  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Leveragei, t-1   
                                                                                 + b8 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  + b9 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                                                                         
+ b10 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1   
                                                                                 + b12 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
Model 2:   Total Line/(Total Line + Cash)i, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Sizei, t-1 + b3 * M/Bi, t-1  + b4 * Net Worthi, t-1   
                                                                                                            
+ b5 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b6  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Leveragei, t-1   
                                                                        + b8 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  + b9 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                                                            
+ b10 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1   
                                                                        + b12 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
 
Panel A. Regressions 
   
 Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
 
Model 1: 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
Model 2: 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
 No RTW RTW No RTW RTW 
Intercept -0.392** -0.776*** -0.322* -0.856*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Union Coverage t-1 1.170*** 0.203 1.284*** -0.068 
 (0.01) (0.78) (0.01) (0.90) 
Size t-1 0.039*** 0.056*** 0.032*** 0.063*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 -0.006*** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.90) (0.01) (0.12) 
Net Worth t-1 0.001 0.206*** 0.028 0.152** 
 (0.99) (0.01) (0.44) (0.04) 
Tangibility t-1 0.030 0.001 0.004 -0.007 
 (0.24) (0.97) (0.87) (0.82) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.026 0.087 0.032 0.096 
 (0.50) (0.25) (0.40) (0.21) 
Leverage t-1 0.242*** 0.387*** 0.411*** 0.465*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.116*** -0.040 -0.120*** -0.083* 
 (0.01) (0.37) (0.01) (0.06) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -1.196** -1.495 -1.233** -2.804*** 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.01) 
Over the Counter Dummy t-1 -0.058** -0.019 -0.068** 0.115** 
 (0.04) (0.69) (0.02) (0.02) 
Not in an S&P Index Dummy t-1 0.023 0.088** 0.043* 0.083** 
 (0.31) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Firm Age t-1 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.25) (0.71) (0.18) (0.35) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1252 521 1252 521 
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.30 0.43 0.35 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test F = 0.09 (p = 0.77) F = 0.99 (p = 0.32) F = 0.26 (p = 0.61) F = 0.67 (p = 0.41) 
Hausman Test F = 13.13 (p = 0.01) F = 0.01 (p = 0.97) F = 15.99 (p = 0.01) F = 0.06 (p = 0.80) 
 
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Coveraget-1  
 
 Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
Difference 
(p-value) 
0.967***  
(0.01) 
1.352*** 
(0.01) 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the status of right-to-
work legislation. We use a sample of 1773 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2003. Panel A shows the regressions. Unused 
Line/(Unused Line + Cash) is the ratio of unused lines of credit to the sum of unused lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, 
where corporate cash holdings are the sum of cash and marketable securities. Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) is the ratio of total 
lines of credit to the sum of total lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. No RTW (RTW) indicates that a firm is not in (is in) 
a state with right-to-work legislation. Union Coverage is the fraction of total workers in an industry who are covered by labor 
unions in the collective bargaining, where the industries are based on the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC). Size is 
the logarithm of non-cash assets, where non-cash assets are total assets less corporate cash holdings. M/B is defined as the book 
value of non-cash assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of non-cash 
assets. Net Worth is defined as assets minus total liabilities divided by non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property 
and equipment to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. Leverage is 
the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of Cash Flow in the prior 20 years. 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by 2-digit SIC 
codes in the prior 20 years. Over the Counter Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s equity trades only over the 
counter and equals zero otherwise. Not in an S&P Index Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is not included in 
one of the main S&P indices and equals zero otherwise. Firm Age is approximated by the number of years that a firm is 
available on Compustat. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for industries defined by 1-digit SIC codes and 
are not reported in the table. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and are not reported in 
the table. The p-value is in parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Coveraget-1 between the two 
sub-groups separated by the status of right-to-work legislation and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. ***,**, 
and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
 Sub-groups Separated by Financial Constraints 
 
Model 1:   Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash)i, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Sizei, t-1 + b3 * M/Bi, t-1  + b4 * Net Worthi, t-1   
                                                                                                                          
+ b5 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b6  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Leveragei, t-1   
                                                                                 + b8 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  + b9 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                                                                         
+ b10 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1   
                                                                                 + b12 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
 
Model 2:   Total Line/(Total Line + Cash)i, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Sizei, t-1 + b3 * M/Bi, t-1  + b4 * Net Worthi, t-1   
                                                                                                            
+ b5 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b6  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Leveragei, t-1   
                                                                        + b8 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  + b9 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                                                            
+ b10 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1   
                                                                        + b12 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
 
Panel A. Sub-groups Separated by Payout 
 
 Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
 
Model 1: 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
Model 2: 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
 Payout
 t-1 < Median Payout t-1 > Median Payout t-1 < Median Payout t-1 > Median 
Intercept -0.616** -0.152 -0.506*** 0.053 
 (0.02) (0.32) (0.01) (0.72) 
Union Coverage t-1 1.763** 0.430 1.637** 0.446 
 (0.04) (0.20) (0.03) (0.21) 
Size t-1 0.044*** 0.030*** 0.046*** 0.025*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 -0.003* -0.007* -0.004*** -0.009*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Worth t-1 0.047 0.117** 0.039 0.076 
 (0.29) (0.04) (0.38) (0.16) 
Tangibility t-1 0.047* 0.029 0.048* 0.010 
 (0.07) (0.26) (0.07) (0.68) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.133*** -0.095 0.154*** -0.115** 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.05) 
Leverage t-1 0.143* 0.592*** 0.252*** 0.660*** 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.055** -0.183*** -0.070*** -0.200*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.008 -1.603** -0.602 -2.044*** 
 (0.99) (0.02) (0.54) (0.01) 
Over the Counter Dummy t-1 -0.087** 0.001 -0.035 -0.001 
 (0.02) (0.98) (0.34) (0.99) 
Not in an S&P Index Dummy t-1 0.101*** -0.014 0.124*** 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.57) (0.01) (0.94) 
Firm Age t-1 -0.003** 0.001 -0.003** -0.001 
 (0.04) (0.90) (0.02) (0.59) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 887 886 887 886 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.36 0.34 0.42 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test F = 0.57 (p = 0.45) F = 0.26 (p = 0.61) F = 0.94 (p = 0.42) F = 1.13 (p = 0.32) 
Hausman Test F = 4.89 (p = 0.03) F = 1.38 (p = 0.24) F = 5.54 (p = 0.02) F = 1.02 (p = 0.38) 
 
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Coveraget-1  
 
 Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
Difference 
(p-value) 
1.333**  
(0.05) 
1.191*  
(0.06) 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
 
Panel C. Sub-groups Separated by the Availability of Credit Ratings 
 
 Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
 
Model 1: 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
Model 2: 
Second Stage of the 2SLS 
 No Credit Ratings With Credit Ratings No Credit Ratings With Credit Ratings 
Intercept -0.356 -0.381*** -0.489** -0.153 
 (0.11) (0.01) (0.03) (0.26) 
Union Coverage t-1 2.082*** -0.077 1.902*** 0.038 
 (0.01) (0.78) (0.01) (0.88) 
Size t-1 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.048*** 0.031*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 -0.002* -0.015*** -0.003* -0.018*** 
 (0.10) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) 
Net Worth t-1 0.057 0.119* 0.030 0.105* 
 (0.19) (0.06) (0.49) (0.08) 
Tangibility t-1 0.042* 0.057** 0.036 0.044* 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.18) (0.10) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.144*** -0.021 0.115** -0.054 
 (0.01) (0.72) (0.02) (0.34) 
Leverage t-1 0.204** 0.431*** 0.357*** 0.501*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.063* 0.066* -0.050 0.061* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.22) (0.08) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.057** -0.168*** -0.070*** -0.165*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Over the Counter Dummy t-1 1.034 -2.619*** -1.293** -3.073*** 
 (0.33) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Not in an S&P Index Dummy t-1 0.022 0.004 0.090*** 0.003 
 (0.54) (0.86) (0.01) (0.90) 
Firm Age t-1 -0.016*** 0.002** -0.008*** 0.001* 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.09) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 814 959 814 959 
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.38 0.35 0.42 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test F = 0.67 (p = 0.57) F = 1.44 (p = 0.22) F = 1.52 (p = 0.21) F = 0.28 (p = 0.84) 
Hausman Test F = 13.29 (p = 0.01) F = 0.66 (p = 0.42) F = 10.72 (p = 0.01) F = 0.01 (p = 0.98) 
 
 
Panel D. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Coveraget-1  
 
 Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
Difference 
(p-value) 
2.159***  
(0.01) 
1.864***  
(0.01) 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by financial 
constraints. We use a sample of 1773 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2003. Panel A reports the regressions for the 
sub-groups separated by payout. Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) is the ratio of unused lines of credit to the sum of 
unused lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, where corporate cash holdings are the sum of cash and marketable 
securities. Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) is the ratio of total lines of credit to the sum of total lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings. Payout is the ratio of the sum of dividends and stock repurchases to assets. Union Coverage is 
the fraction of total workers in an industry who are covered by labor unions in the collective bargaining, where the 
industries are based on the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC). Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets, where 
non-cash assets are total assets less corporate cash holdings. M/B is defined as the book value of non-cash assets minus 
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of non-cash assets. Net Worth is 
defined as assets minus total liabilities divided by non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. Leverage is 
the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of Cash Flow in the prior 20 
years. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by 2-
digit SIC codes in the prior 20 years. Over the Counter Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s equity 
trades only over the counter and equals zero otherwise. Not in an S&P Index Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one 
if a firm is not included in one of the main S&P indices and equals zero otherwise. Firm Age is approximated by the 
number of years that a firm is available on Compustat. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for industries 
defined by 1-digit SIC codes and are not reported in the table. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
years in the sample and are not reported in the table. The p-value is in parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the 
coefficients of Union Coveraget-1 between the two sub-groups separated by payout and reports the p-value of the t-test in 
the parentheses. Panel C reports the regressions for the sub-groups separated by the availability of credit ratings. The p-
value is in parentheses. Panel D shows the difference in the coefficients of Union Coveraget-1 between the two sub-groups 
separated by the availability of credit rating and reports the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. ***,**, and * denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 9 
 Union Coverage and the Forms of Corporate Liquidity: Labor Intensity 
 
Model 1:   Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash)i, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Sizei, t-1 + b3 * M/Bi, t-1  + b4 * Net Worthi, t-1   
                                                                                                                          
+ b5 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b6  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Leveragei, t-1   
                                                                                 + b8 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  + b9 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                                                                         
+ b10 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1   
                                                                                 + b12 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
 
Model 2:   Total Line/(Total Line + Cash)i, t  = a + b1 * Union Coveragei, t-1  + b2 * Sizei, t-1 + b3 * M/Bi, t-1  + b4 * Net Worthi, t-1   
                                                                                                            
+ b5 * Tangibilityi, t-1  + b6  * Cash Flowi, t-1 + b7 * Leveragei, t-1   
                                                                        + b8 * Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  + b9 * Industry Cash Flow Volatilityi, t-1  
                                                                                                            
+ b10 * Over the Counter Dummyi, t-1  + b11 * Not in an S&P Index Dummyi, t-1   
                                                                        + b12 * Firm Agei, t-1  + Industry Dummy Variables  + Year Dummy Variables + εi, t 
 
Panel A. Regressions 
   
 Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
 Model 1: Model 2: 
 Second Stage of the 2SLS Second Stage of the 2SLS 
 
Labor Intensity
 t-1 
< Median 
Labor Intensity
 t-1  
> Median 
Labor Intensity
 t-1 
< Median 
Labor Intensity
 t-1  
> Median 
Intercept -0.676*** -0.226 -0.686*** -0.066 
 (0.01) (0.19) (0.01) (0.82) 
Union Coverage t-1 1.147*** 1.043** 1.390*** 1.261* 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) 
Size t-1 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.031*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 -0.002* -0.010*** -0.003** -0.013*** 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Net Worth t-1 0.069* 0.120** 0.064 0.138*** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.12) (0.01) 
Tangibility t-1 0.102*** -0.130*** 0.105*** -0.152*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.005 0.143*** 0.022 0.157*** 
 (0.91) (0.01) (0.62) (0.01) 
Leverage t-1 0.416*** 0.340*** 0.462*** 0.588*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.086*** -0.011 -0.086*** -0.048 
 (0.01) (0.84) (0.01) (0.39) 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.114 -1.119* 0.256 -0.594 
 (0.88) (0.10) (0.75) (0.53) 
Over the Counter Dummy t-1 -0.082** -0.023 -0.057 -0.001 
 (0.02) (0.52) (0.12) (0.99) 
Not in an S&P Index Dummy t-1 0.058** -0.020 0.077*** 0.020 
 (0.04) (0.45) (0.01) (0.45) 
Firm Age t-1 -0.002** 0.001 -0.002** -0.001* 
 (0.04) (0.95) (0.03) (0.10) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 886 887 886 887 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.36 0.44 0.39 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test 
 
F = 0.29  
(p = 0.59) 
F = 0.49  
(p = 0.48) 
F = 0.86 
(p = 0.35) 
F = 0.45  
(p = 0.71) 
Hausman Test 
 
F = 10.56  
(p = 0.01) 
F = 3.41  
(p = 0.06) 
F = 17.69  
(p = 0.01) 
F = 5.50  
(p = 0.02) 
 
 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Coveraget-1  
 
 Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) 
Difference 
(p-value) 
0.104  
(0.78) 
0.129  
(0.74) 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
 
Notes: 
This table shows the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS estimation for the sub-groups separated by the labor intensity. We use 
a sample of 1773 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2003. Panel A reports the regressions. Unused Line/(Unused Line + Cash) 
is the ratio of unused lines of credit to the sum of unused lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, where corporate cash 
holdings are the sum of cash and marketable securities. Total Line/(Total Line + Cash) is the ratio of total lines of credit to the 
sum of total lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Labor Intensity is the ratio of the number of employees to assets. Union 
Coverage is the fraction of total workers in an industry who are covered by labor unions in the collective bargaining, where the 
industries are based on the 3-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC). Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets, where non-cash 
assets are total assets less corporate cash holdings. M/B is defined as the book value of non-cash assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of non-cash assets. Net Worth is defined as assets minus total 
liabilities divided by non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Cash Flow is 
the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of Cash Flow in the prior 20 years. Industry Cash Flow Volatility is the standard 
deviation of the median of Cash Flow in an industry classified by 2-digit SIC codes in the prior 20 years. Over the Counter 
Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s equity trades only over the counter and equals zero otherwise. Not in an 
S&P Index Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is not included in one of the main S&P indices and equals zero 
otherwise. Firm Age is approximated by the number of years that a firm is available on Compustat. Industry Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for industries defined by 1-digit SIC codes and are not reported in the table. Year Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the years in the sample and are not reported in the table. The p-value is in parentheses. Panel B shows 
the difference in the coefficients of Union Coveraget-1 between the two sub-groups separated by the labor intensity and reports 
the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
